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COME N O W the Defendant/Appellant Herold I,, G r e g o r y , T r u s t e e ,
for and on behal.t. cr: ;.oe M a r i t a . ami
Eccles

F a m i l y Trus-

Hereinafter

"Defendant Gregc.-. '

•. •

\

rustt

I tin; AIIM-I'I

"Defendant/Appellant

Gregory",

"Gregory") by and through h i s a t t o r n e y ,

Jef f rey K. W o o d b u r y , and Defendants /Appellants Dean and Chri s I :I
B r a d s h a w (hereinafter "Defendants/Appellants Bradshaw" , "Defendants
Brads haw

ai id or

Bradshaw" ) ai id joint J y petit i on tl :i I s Court iui a

rehearing on the issues involved in the appeal of this matter.

INTRODUCTION
The Court having entered its opinion In this matter, the
Appellants jointly believe that the Court has overlooked and/or
misunderstood several material facts and points oi l.iw

.

>*

important to this case, ~*r- th^ consideration of which warrants a
rehea. *
Rule 3ht

> |.->n I

'-•

'>etiti on i .s submitted pursuant to

utan Rules of A p p e l l a t e Procedure {1990) for t h e purposes

of r e q u e s t i n g a rehearing to clarify those facts a n d points of law
for the C o u r t ,

SUMMARY OF T H E A R G U M E N T
The find i ji-.j." .:
important

t o this

the Court of Appeals

transaction

lhal: fjf'reage W H S mot

is inconsistent

with

t h e trial

C o u r t ' s finding that it w a s the acreage that w a s important b e c a u s e
it w a s t h e v e r y basis upon w h i c h the property was d I M ided I i 1 to two
parcels.
two

G r e g o r y s m a d e their d e c i s i o n t

parcel s based

oi i 1: hei i: irel i ai i<
1

iivide t h e p r o p e r t y into
erroneous

survey.

Grahns understood that and all parties relied on the survey and on
the resulting misplacement of the survey stakes. Gregory would not
have divided the property had they known about the mistake and they
would have never made the contract to sell parcel one separately to
Grahns.

Where the parties negotiated their contract while under

mistaken assumptions which, if known, would have prevented the
contract from being made, the injured party is entitled to the
remedy rescission of the contract,

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS MADE A NEW FINDING OF FACT,
INCONSISTENT WITH THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT,
THAT THE ACREAGE WAS NOT IMPORTANT TO THIS TRANSACTION
This Court appears to have made a new finding of fact,
inconsistent with the findings of the trial court, that acreage was
not important to this transaction.
reformation decision.

The new finding justifies a

This Court found that Appellants did not

carry their burden of proof before the Court of Appeals, but in
fact, Appellants did carry their burden of proof in the trial
court.
The trial court is the finder of fact, and it is not the
function of the appellate court to make findings of fact because it
does not have the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses
testify.

Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979).

The trial

court has the benefit of hearing testimony in open court and
weighing the evidence at the same time and in the light that it is
2

presented.

Moreover, in this case, the trial court visited and

viewed the subject property.

The trial court is therefore in a

better position to know and understand the facts of the case.

In

an equity case the appellate court may weigh facts as well as
review the law, but it may reverse on the facts only when the
evidence clearly preponderates against the findings of the trial
court. Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981).
The trial court found:
13.
The description to Parcel One was obtained by
plaintiffs Grahn from the Salt Lake County Recorders
Office. The description designated Parcel One as being
1.11 acres and accepted by the trustee and defendants
Grahn as acreage to be sold and purchased.
The trial court based this finding on complicated testimony
from

many

sources.

The

initial

earnest

money

upon

which

negotiations were based referred only to the acre and one half acre
parcel.

In several parts the Agreement pointed to the specific

size of the parcel.

See Addendum No. 6 in Brief of Appellant

Gregory.
The trial court understood that the acreage was an important
factor in this transaction.

Otherwise, the Court would not have

seen fit to make this finding and he would not have ruled that the
Grahns should pay for the extra acreage they were receiving through
reformation.

The acreage was important because it was the basis

for which the property was divided.
Grahns testified that they wanted the entire property, but
could not afford the entire piece. The Gregorys therefore agreed
3

to divide the property, and based that decision on the survey they
had which showed them they could do so and get at least one-half
acre where they wanted it to the southeast of the driveway. Grahns
understood that Gregorys division of the property was based upon
the survey,

(See Testimony of Josephine Grahn, Transcript p. 94,

Lines 8-13 and p. 99 lines 12-19) The Gregorys testified that they
would not have divided the property had they known that the
division could not meet those wishes. Therefore the transaction to
sell Grahns Parcel One would not have ever occurred if Mr. McNeil
had not made his mistake.

The parties were under mistaken

assumptions based on that erroneous survey when Grahns purchased
Parcel One. All parties relied on that survey.

(See Testimony of

Josephine Grahn, Transcript p. 97, lines 13-21) Those mistaken
assumptions were so material, that if known, they would have
prevented the division of the property and sale to Grahns of Parcel
One altogether.
Gregorys' division of the property which made the sale to the
Grahns possible was based upon a mistaken survey.

The parties to

the sale assumed the survey was correct because without the survey
the parties could not have divided and sold the property, the
amount of acreage was material to the transaction.
remaining

after

reformation

does

not

conform

The parcel
with

zoning

requirements, is on a steep hill and is potentially subject to an
aesthetic easement which further restricts the buildable space on
the parcel. All of which, Gregory did not intend and resulted from
4

the mistaken survey and was an assumption upon which the division
of

the

property

was

based.

All

of

which

are

material

considerations and assumptions upon which the parties relied in
making their agreement.

The underlying

survey which created

parcels 1 and 2 was a material element in negotiating the sale of
both parcels.

The mistaken designation of the size of the parcel

was central to the parties bargain.

The mistake which

occurred in this case was not a scrivener's or drafter's mistake
but rather a mistake in the survey which creating the very parcel
the parties desired

to buy and

sell.

The sale itself was

accomplished through the mistaken survey and without the mistake in
the survey the sale would never had occurred.

This has a material

affect upon the agreed exchange of performances and warrants
rescission under Section 152 of the Restatement 2d of Contracts.
This Court stated that Gregorys rejected McNeil's tender of a
revised survey after the mistake was discovered, which included
one-half acre for parcel 2 and used the road as the boundaries.
They did so for more reasons than merely because Bradshaws could
not build the home they had designed on the property.

Gregorys

rejected the revised survey because the zoning commission required
one-half acre to build and the land which McNeil needed to include
in the revised survey to get one-half acre did not add to the
buildable space and would be useless because it was land which
would be too steep or narrow to build on. Moreover, the division

5

of the property in the revised survey was not the Trust's intention
and the Trust would not have divided the property that way.
Gregorys' concern with acreage is clear and logical and they
carried the burden in this regard with the trial court.

They

simply would not have intended to convey to Grahns part of the
acreage from what they understood was Parcel Two.

POINT II
THE COURT HAS MISUNDERSTOOD THE FACTS
IN FINDING THAT THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION
ON GRAHNS' EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT
WAS NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PHYSICAL
STAKED BOUNDARIES OF PARCEL ONE
This Court found that (1) the Recorder's Office apparently
used the Danielson deed on parcel two as a basis for the legal
description for parcel one, that (2) as a result of the mistake of
the original survey, the Recorder's legal description of parcel one
was not in conformity with the physical staked boundaries of parcel
one, and (3) that they legal description on the Grahn's Earnest
Money

Agreement

and

Deed

were

different.

This

Court

has

misunderstood the facts. The physical staked boundaries on parcel
one at the time the Grahns and Gregorys negotiated the sale of
Parcel One had been placed there by Mr. McNeil and were based upon
his erroneous survey. The legal description on the Danielson deed
for Parcel 2 was also based upon that same survey.

Therefore, if

the Recorder used the Danielson deed as a basis to create the legal
description for Parcel One, the legal description did have to
conform with the physical staked boundaries since they were all
6

based

upon

the

same

erroneous

survey.

McNeil's

error was

incorporated into the placement of the physical boundary stakes, it
was incorporated into the negotiations for sale of both parcels,
and it was incorporated into the legal descriptions on both deeds.
The difference between the legal descriptions attached to the
Grahns' Earnest Money Agreement and their Deed were minor and
immaterial to this lawsuit*
Since the parties relied on the boundary stakes and on the
survey when they entered into their transaction, they were under
mistaken assumptions about the division of the property and the
correspondent boundaries.

Their understanding and intentions in

negotiating this sale were all made while under these mistaken
assumptions, and the sale would not have been made at all had the
Gregorys known that the division of the property did not conform to
all their intentions.

POINT III
THE REMEDY OF RESCISSION ALLOWS THE
GRAHNS TO KEEP THE PROPERTY THEY PURCHASED
OR TO RESCIND THEIR CONTRACT
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS

§

152

describes

the

situation where a party may rescind an agreement based upon a
mutual mistake of fact:

"Where a mistake of both parties at the

time the contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the
contract was made and has a material affect on the agreed exchange
of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected
party unless he bears the risk of the mistake. . . " Utah courts have
7

adopted

the

RESTATEMENT

position.

See Mooney

v.

G.R.

and

Associates, 746 P.2d 1174, 1179, (Ut. App. 1987). Kiahtipes v.
Mills, 649 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah 1982), Renner v. Kehl, 722 P.2d 262,
264-265 (Ariz. 1986).

See also Tanner v. District of Judges of the

Third Judicial District Court, 649 P.2d 5 (Utah 1982).
The remedy of rescission would not force the Grahns out of
their property.

It would only give them the option to rescind or

remain in the property with an amended access.

The Appellants

concur with this Court that it would be harsh to force the Grahns
to abandon their property after they have expended so much time and
money in improvements.

It is undisputed that the Grahns had not

sold their existing house or moved into the house on Brookburn Road
until after they learned of the mistake.

The Appellants do not

wish that the Grahns give up the property.

They only wish the

Court to rule that the Grahns either take what they actually
purchased,

the

1.1

acre

lot,

or

rescind

their

contract.

Unfortunately to keep the property, would involve the Grahns'
having to move the driveway onto their property. But this seems to
be

the easiest

situation.

and most

equitable

remedy to this

difficult

With this result the Grahns can keep their property,

Bradshaws can build their home and Gregorys can enforce both
agreements they made.

This was a case of mutual mistake by the

parties while bargaining, about the nature of the property which
was the subject of their contract.
rescission.

It warrants a remedy of

Under that remedy, the party who was injured by the

mistake - the Grahns - would have the right to rescind their
8

contract or to keep what they actually received - the 1.1 acre
parcel of land,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J_

day of November, 1990.

WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER
& SWINTON, <P.C.
wbodbury
Atj^cW:A^y/for Defendants/Appell^ts
Gregory

//%^xx^n/^
Russell S. Walker
Attorney for Appellants Bradshaw

CERTIFICATION BY COUNSEL
Counsel hereby certifies that the foregoing Petition is not
being brought in bad faith or for delay, but is brought on the
grounds that the Appellants believe the Court has misunderstood
and/or overlooked important facts and law which, if correctly
understood

or addressed, would have resulted

in a different

decision by the Court.
Dated this 7

day of November, 1990.
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON

LL

."^Woodbury
or Appellc
for
Appellants Gregory
Russell S. Walker
Attorney for Appellants Bradshaw
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of November, 1990, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing, PETITION FOR
REHEARING, to be mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
John S. Adams
Robert M. Taylor
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Allen Sims, Esq,
ALLEN SIMS, P.C.
8 East Broadway, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

J:\JKW\GREGORY.N07
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